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Introduction 
One aspect of the devolution of power to Scotland was the introduction of proportional 
representation (PR) for Scottish Parliament elections. This was part of the ‘new politics’ that 
was meant to replace the majoritarian, winner-take-all approach typical of British politics 
(Brown, 2000). Critics have argued that the new politics advocated by supporters of 
devolution in the late 1990s did not materialise (Mitchell, 2010), though others (Crawford, 
2010) remain upbeat. This article argues that one crucial aspect of the attempt to engineer a 
new politics in Scotland after devolution, the electoral system, not only failed to facilitate a 
new politics, but actually exacerbated the existing animosity between Scotland’s two main 
parties, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Scottish Labour Party, by providing an 
environment that fosters tensions between Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) 
elected in single-member constituencies and in larger multimember regions. The SNP and 
Labour are long-standing rivals (Lynch, 2002), with the latter party dominating Scottish 
politics in the late twentieth century and participating as the bigger partner in two Labour-
Liberal Democrat majority coalition governments (1999-2007) immediately after devolution. 
The mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system, introduced for the first 
Scottish Parliament election in 1999, allows voters to cast one vote for a candidate in one of 
73 single-member constituencies, while another vote can be cast for a party list (or an 
independent candidate) in eight electoral regions. MSPs are elected by plurality (the most 
votes) in the former case, while in the latter, they are usually elected from closed party lists in 
such a way that the overall regional result – adding the seven regional MSPs and nine (on 
average) constituency MSPs – is roughly proportional on a partisan basis to the results of the 
regional vote. Research carried out in the first decade of devolution shows that tensions 
between constituency and regional MSPs, who serve overlapping geographical areas, have 
developed over constituency service (Cowley and Lochore, 2000; McCabe and McCormick, 
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2000; Bradbury and Russell, 2005; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2007; Carman and Shephard, 
2007; Lundberg, 2007). 
This article confirms those findings, adding that the tensions had not subsided at the 
end of the first decade of devolution by providing a case study of parliamentary submissions 
of MSPs who reacted, in 2008, to proposals both to entrench and expand the office allowance 
disadvantage for many regional MSPs, and to revise the wording of the MSPs’ code of 
conduct in a more neutral direction. This hostility to the interests of regional MSPs reflects, to 
some extent, the circumstances of election results before 2011: the majority of Labour and 
Liberal Democrat MSPs were elected in single-member constituencies, while most SNP and 
Conservative MSPs were elected in multimember regions. Many constituency MSPs 
displayed rational self-interest (at least in the short term) by supporting rules that would 
potentially harm their opponents’ ability to compete with them on an electoral basis. This 
deeply partisan outcome, while reflecting the successful operation of rational choice logic on 
the part of individual politicians, worked against the larger attempt to engineer a less 
adversarial post-devolution politics in Scotland.  
Rationality here is defined as the desire by constituency candidates to maximise their 
votes (Downs, 1957) by performing constituency service, making a local name for themselves 
and gaining a personal vote that might withstand drops in support for their party (Fenno, 
1978; Cain et al., 1987). MMP with dual candidacy (where candidates are able to stand in 
both single-member constituencies and on party lists simultaneously) provides an electoral 
incentive for list-elected candidates who want to contest a constituency within their region at 
the next election; rather than shirking constituency duties, as might be expected with closed-
list PR (Bowler and Farrell, 1993), list-elected candidates who plan to stand as both regional 
list and constituency candidates at the next election have an electoral incentive to target the 
constituency they hope to be nominated in for extra attention. Constituency-elected 
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candidates, particularly those who believe themselves likely to be re-elected in their 
constituency without recourse to the party list, might find it rational to maximise their vote by 
reducing competition from regional list-elected candidates who target their constituency by 
‘shadowing’ them – behaving like surrogate constituency MSPs. 
Devolution was supposed to facilitate a less adversarial, more pluralistic, new politics 
in Scotland, and PR, seen by Arend Lijphart (1999) as a crucial component of the consensus 
model of democracy, is a major part of this effort to engineer a shift from the adversarial 
behaviour associated with the Westminster model (Bulmer, 2011; Lundberg, 2012). Yet many 
of the comments made by MSPs about their colleagues in 2008 indicate that at least some 
aspects of the old politics were alive and well. The mixed-member form of PR has 
exacerbated the long-standing tensions between Scottish Labour and the SNP by creating an 
environment that fosters constant competition. Labour used to have great success in 
constituency races, winning most of its seats on that basis. Perhaps because of this history of 
success, only a small number of Labour constituency candidates also stood on regional party 
lists. Labour’s failure to participate extensively in dual candidacy – which is the practice of 
most other Scottish parties – led in the 2011 election to the loss of several high-profile 
candidates, some of whom ended up as advisers to novice Labour list candidates elected in 
what would probably have been their places had they practised dual candidacy (Scotsman, 
2011).  
This failure makes Labour’s assumptions appear flawed, indicative of short-term 
rational calculations that neglected long-term considerations. In a broader sense, the outcomes 
examined in the following case study may lead observers to question the utility of 
institutional engineering in facilitating significant changes in the operation of politics. While 
at the ‘micro’ level, individual politicians appear to respond to the electoral incentives created 
by MMP in Scotland, there has been a failure at the ‘macro’ level to engineer a less 
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adversarial new politics. To top off this failure of institutional choice, MMP allowed the SNP 
to win a majority of seats on a minority of the vote when the party won 69 of the Scottish 
Parliament’s 129 seats in the 2011 election – exactly what the designers of the Scottish 
Parliament’s electoral system believed could not happen (Mitchell, 2000). The Scottish 
experience with institutional engineering may be of interest to other countries contemplating 
changes in their political institutions – ‘engineers’ should look carefully at the party system 
and electoral competition when considering institutional changes, not forgetting how a 
proposed change’s impact on the ‘micro’ level of politicians’ behaviour might affect the 
larger goal. 
 
MMP in Scotland 
MMP (usually called the ‘additional member system’ in the UK) was originally 
recommended by the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the 1990s as it drew up the 
blueprint for Scottish devolution (Curtice, 1996). Introduced in New Zealand in 1996 after 
two referendums, MMP is based upon the German electoral system and the New Zealand-
coined term ‘mixed-member proportional’ is commonly used by political scientists worldwide 
(Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Lijphart, 1999; Reynolds et al., 2005). MMP is ‘mixed’ 
because representatives are elected via two different routes – by single-member plurality, and 
by regional or nationwide party lists. In Scotland, the regional (rather than nationwide) 
compensatory mechanism yields a less proportional result on a partisan basis than is the case 
in other MMP systems, such as New Zealand’s, but it is not correct to label Scottish MMP as 
semi-proportional, since compensation is attempted; semi-proportional non-compensatory or 
‘parallel’ mixed-member systems do exist (called ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ or MMM) 
and are actually more common than MMP (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001).  
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The proportional nature of MMP has, in fact, revealed the true extent of political 
pluralism in Scotland since the late 1990s (Table 1). Labour was the dominant party in 
Scottish politics for decades, but has been facing challenges from the SNP since the 1970s 
with the rise of a national identity ‘group loyalty’ or issue dimension (Brand et al., 1983, p. 
464), what others would call the centre-periphery cleavage, an addition to the class cleavage 
in Scotland (Bohrer II and Krutz 2005, p. 665). Aside from the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives, Greens and Scottish Socialists (among others) have also been elected to the 
Scottish Parliament, so the party system in Scotland has been described as one of moderate 
pluralism (Bennie and Clark 2003, p. 153), although the competition between the SNP and 
Labour has not been ‘moderate’ – the conflicts between the two in the 1990s has been 
described as ‘extensive’ (Lynch 2002, p. 223).  
Table 1 about here 
Much of this conflict between the two parties takes place at the constituency level in 
Scottish Parliament elections, with Labour candidates’ initial success giving way to 
significant failure, as election results in Table 1 reveal. Labour’s share of both the regional 
vote and the constituency vote has dropped from a 1999 level of 33.6% and 38.8%, 
respectively, to 26.3% and 31.7% in 2011. The party’s number of constituency seats won (out 
the 73 available) dropped from 53 in 1999, to 15 in 2011. The compensatory nature of MMP 
means that Labour’s regional seats (out of the 56 available) rose from 3 in 1999 to 22 in 2011. 
From 1999 to 2011, Labour went from a party of primarily constituency-elected MSPs (and a 
large number of them) to a party in which most MSPs are elected from regional lists. The 
opposite process has occurred for the SNP, which rose from 27.3% and 28.7% of the 1999 
regional and constituency vote, respectively, to 44.0% and 45.4% in 2011, with an increase in 
constituency seats from 7 in 1999 to 53 in 2011.  
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The results for the 2007 election (Table 1), in which the SNP won one more seat than 
Labour and went on to form a minority government, show how Labour had begun to lose a 
significant number of constituency seats (from 53 in 1999 to 37 in 2007), with the SNP 
making big gains (from 7 in 1999 to 21 in 2007), though Labour still held more constituency 
seats than the SNP, and only held 9 regional seats. Continued decline for Labour at the 
constituency level would, however, force the party to rely upon a larger number of regional 
seats after future elections, yet the party’s MSPs have constantly displayed a hostile attitude 
towards regional MSPs. One of the Scottish Parliament’s earliest decisions established a 
system of office allowances for its members. Shortly after the parliament first began its 
business in 1999, Labour’s MSPs joined Liberal Democrats in introducing a system of office 
running cost allowances that discriminated against parties with more than one regionally 
elected MSP per region by reducing the allowance: once a party had more than one regional 
MSP elected, the MSPs only received a portion of the full allowance that was determined by 
adding 30 per cent of the full allowance for each subsequent MSP elected and then dividing 
the sum by the total number of the party’s MSPs in that region (Scottish Parliament 1999, col. 
301). Because most Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs were elected on a constituency basis, 
while most SNP and Conservative MSPs were elected on a regional basis, this system of 
office allowances would have an adverse impact on the opposition: regional MSPs from the 
same party were expected to open (and share) only one office per region, although this could 
be expanded to two offices in sparsely populated regions.  
During the debate, Labour MSPs invoked the notion that constituency MSPs, not 
regional ones, would be the first point of contact for most of their constituents, regardless of 
how constituents voted at the last election (Scottish Parliament, 1999). A set of guidelines 
added to the MSPs’ code of conduct more explicitly cited an ‘expectation’ that a constituency 
MSP would be the ‘usual point of contact’ for constituents, despite the ‘key principle’ that all 
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MSPs have equal status; the ‘guidance’ also required regional MSPs to work in ‘more than 
two’ constituencies (Scottish Parliament, 2000). Discouraging the shadowing of constituency 
MSPs by their regional counterparts, who might be trying to raise their electoral profile in the 
event that they stand against the incumbent in the next constituency election, is probably the 
main factor motivating constituency MSPs’ hostility to their regional counterparts. If most of 
your party’s representatives are elected in constituencies, it may be rational to support policies 
that are likely to hurt your opponents. 
This rudimentary rational choice logic might have explained Labour’s position on 
regional MSPs before the 2007 election, but the party’s lacklustre performance in that election 
should have forced some questioning of not only the attitudes towards regional MSPs, but 
also dual candidacy. Labour fielded very few of its constituency candidates on regional lists 
(only 19%, compared to 52% for the Liberal Democrats, 78% for the SNP, and 86% for the 
Conservatives) in 2011 (Guardian, 2011), costing the party some high-profile candidates. 
This issue could have been revisited, with Labour’s Scottish Executive Committee’s chair 
after the party’s 2007 defeat, Stuart Clark, on record saying that Labour should consider 
changing its opposition to dual candidacy (Macdonell, 2008).  
 Yet the party did not alter its hostility to dual candidacy, and to regional MSPs in 
general during the period after the 2007 election, as the case study to follow illustrates. 
Explaining Labour MSPs’ views on these matters, with reference to the rational choice 
literature, is difficult. A survey of the literature reveals a dispute between scholars who 
believe that political actors make rational choices along the lines of classical economics, using 
well-informed cost/benefit analyses, and those who argue that there are boundaries to such 
rationality. Bounded rationality is, according to Herbert Simon, ‘behavior that is adaptive 
within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the 
decision-maker’ (Simon, 1985, p. 294), resulting in an approach that combines the 
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‘economic’ and ‘psychological’ versions of rationality. Bryan Jones (1999, p. 298) argues that 
‘most behavior in politicians is adaptive and intendedly rational but that limits on adaptive 
behavior, imposed by human cognitive/emotional architecture, may be detected in even the 
most stable of environments’. In the business psychology literature, Daniel Kahneman and 
Dan Lovallo (1993, p. 28) find evidence suggesting ‘that many significant decisions made in 
organizations are guided by unrealistic forecasts of their consequences’. Cognitive illusions, 
such as a sense of electoral invincibility, can lead to miscalculations (Jones, 1999, p. 306). A 
politician’s short time horizon can also compromise rational behaviour (Pierson, 2000, p. 
479). Short-term considerations, perhaps aided by British majoritarian cultural attitudes, 
appear to have guided Labour MSPs in their continued hostility towards regional MSPs. 
 
Competition between MSPs 
The tensions between the two types of elected representatives seen in Scotland are far less 
evident in the ‘homeland’ of MMP, Germany. Werner Patzelt (1997, p. 60) argues ‘it is 
obvious that for an MP the constituency work is a critical part of holding his office. 
Consequently, the representatives devote about one-third of their working hours to 
constituency work’. Most Germans do not appear to distinguish between constituency and 
regional (federal state-elected) representatives (Burkett, 1985, p. 130), largely because dual 
candidacy is allowed and is commonly practised (Jesse, 1988, p. 120; Massicotte, 2004, p. 
73). This means that candidates losing in constituency contests can be elected through party 
lists when they are in sufficiently high list positions, usually establishing offices in 
constituencies where they were defeated; shadowing of constituency-elected candidates is 
thus normal (Burkett, 1985, p. 129-30). German Bundestag members receive the same office 
allowance regardless of how they are elected (German Bundestag, 2012). 
 10 
In New Zealand, MPs elected via a national party list receive smaller office 
allowances than their constituency-elected counterparts because the assumption is that the 
latter will use the allowance for two offices, while the former will only have one; some MPs 
find this unfair, claiming that the disparity in allowances can limit ‘the ability of list MPs to 
make contacts with voters to the depth and extent of constituency members’ (McLeay and 
Vowles, 2007, p. 74). Other MPs, however, accept the lower allowance for list MPs 
(including some Green list-elected MPs interviewed in 2010 by the author), and there was no 
move to equalise allowances. Dual candidacy is practised in New Zealand, and while party 
politicians do not seem very concerned about it, there has been some public unease. An 
official inquiry into MMP in 2001 rejected restrictions on the practice, and the early years of 
MMP saw little transfer between the two tiers of MPs from election to election (McLeay and 
Vowles, 2007, p. 76). The matter of dual candidacy was brought up for public consultation in 
the review of MMP that followed the 2011 referendum on whether to retain the system (in 
which 58% of voters voted to keep MMP), and the majority of public comments were 
supportive of the practice (Electoral Commission, 2012). New Zealand politicians interviewed 
in 2010 by the author were tolerant of MMP, with members of most parties supportive of the 
system and very few in favour of significant change. Furthermore, there was no domination of 
constituency seats by just one major party in New Zealand or Germany in the way that Labour 
dominated such seats in Scotland and Wales in the early years of devolution (Bradbury, 2007, 
pp. 153-4), so both major parties in New Zealand and Germany could expect to win seats in 
both the constituency and list tiers, making it less attractive to imply that list-elected 
colleagues were ‘second-class’ representatives. 
While dual candidacy appears not to be especially controversial among politicians in 
Germany or New Zealand, the practice is so disliked by the UK Labour Party that it was 
banned for Welsh Assembly elections (as of 2007), though not for Scottish Parliament or 
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London Assembly elections (but Labour’s candidates for the latter two bodies do not 
normally pursue dual candidacy). Although some Labour deputies have no problem with the 
competition they face from other parties’ MSPs or Welsh Assembly Members (AMs), others 
refer to regional MSPs and AMs who lose constituency races (often to Labour candidates) 
and win via their dual candidacies on regional lists as having been ‘rejected by the voters’, to 
use the language of former Welsh Secretary Peter Hain (BBC News Web site, 2006). By 
contrast, scholars have argued that dual candidacy in Germany facilitates the competition over 
constituency service that enhances the link between representatives and their constituents 
(Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Massicotte 2004), and the 
same should be the case in Scotland and Wales (Lundberg, 2006). Part of the problem for 
Labour in accepting dual candidacy appears to lie in its highly majoritarian view of 
democracy, a view that is incompatible with the logic of PR (Lundberg, 2007, p. 164). These 
cultural attitudes combined with short-term rational calculations to maintain Labour hostility 
towards regional MSPs, as the case study below will show. 
 
Revisiting office allowances  
Events in 2008 allowed for a reassessment of the relationship between constituency and list 
MSPs. Looking into the issue of office allowances for MSPs, the Allowances Review Panel 
stated ‘we are as satisfied as we can be that a greater workload falls on constituency 
Members’ (Allowances Review Panel, 2008, p. 32), despite recognising that ‘we could not 
make a detailed assessment of caseload’ (Allowances Review Panel, 2008, p. 31). 
Nevertheless, the panel recommended that the annual office staff salary allowance for 
constituency MSPs be set at a maximum of £62,000, while the limit for regional MSPs should 
be £45,000, based upon the notion that constituency MSPs should be able to hire 2 to 2.5 full-
time equivalent staff members, while their regional counterparts should only be able to hire 
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1.5 to 2 (Allowances Review Panel, 2008, pp. 33-4). The previous office allowance 
reimbursement system, as set out in 2001, was characterised by a reduction in the portion 
used to reimburse the office running costs of regional MSPs when more than one was elected 
from a party’s list in a region, but did not contain a cap on staff salary reimbursement, the 
largest portion of the allowance and obviously linked to the number of staff members 
employed (Scottish Parliament 2001, col. 1901). 
The research on MSPs’ constituency work commissioned by the Allowances Review 
Panel and carried out by the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) was based on a 
very small sample of five (three constituency and two regional) MSPs (Scottish Parliament 
Information Centre, 2007, pp. 7-8). This research was actually criticised by one of the 
Allowances Review Panel’s members, Lord (James) Selkirk of Douglas, a former 
Conservative MSP for the Lothians region. Selkirk, whose dissent was recorded in the panel’s 
report (Allowances Review Panel, 2008, p. 34), complained of how limited the evidence 
regarding the constituency work of MSPs was (‘too small to make a judgment’), noting that 
‘the allowances at the outset were not identical between the two categories of MSP and I 
objected in principle to them widening the gap further’ (Dinwoodie, 2008). Another reaction 
to the panel’s recommendation to widen the gap between constituency and regional MSPs’ 
office allowances came from SNP regional MSP Christine Grahame, who pointed out a major 
difference in three of the MSPs whose constituency caseloads were examined by SPICe: 
‘How could they possibly compare the two constituency MSPs who have been in office for 
more than eight years with a regional list MP [sic] who only came into office last May and 
cannot possibly have had time to build up a full case load? It’s ridiculous. They are basing 
their recommendation on false evidence’ (Dinwoodie, 2008). 
The nature of the evidence used by the Allowances Review Panel to support its 
recommendation of a two-tier office staff reimbursement allowance arose when the Scottish 
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Parliament debated the issue in June 2008 and rejected the funding distinction between 
constituency and regional MSPs. While most of the original scheme introduced by Labour 
constituency MSP Tom McCabe, a member of the panel, was not controversial, McCabe 
recognised that the panel’s ‘recommendation has caused considerable concern among list 
members and, indeed, others’ (Scottish Parliament, 2008a, col. 9667). SNP constituency MSP 
Tricia Marwick introduced the amendment that altered the panel’s recommendation of the 
two-tier allowance scheme, noting that because equality between constituency and regional 
MSPs is a basic principle of the Scottish Parliament, in order to move away from that 
principle, ‘overwhelming evidence that we should do so must be presented. However, there is 
no such overwhelming evidence, as Tom McCabe acknowledged’ (Scottish Parliament, 
2008a, col. 9688).  
The vote on Marwick’s amendment saw the SNP, Conservatives, and Greens (plus 
some regional Liberal Democrat MSPs, whose party allowed a free vote on the issue) succeed 
in overcoming Labour (and some Liberal Democrat) opposition to her proposal for a single 
£54,620 limit for office staff salaries, regardless of how the MSP is elected (Scottish 
Parliament, 2008a, col. 9691). While not all Labour MSPs spoke against Marwick’s 
amendment, most were critical, with constituency MSP Cathie Craigie saying that in the 
‘Lanarkshire area of the Central Scotland region, the electorate rejected five SNP MSPs, but 
yet they are here in the Parliament’, alluding to how dual candidacy allows those who lose 
constituency contests to become MSPs via the regional list when they are ranked high enough 
(Scottish Parliament, 2008a, col. 9695). 
Hostility towards regional MSPs who try to shadow constituency MSPs they plan to 
stand against at the next election appeared to be a major factor in Labour’s attempt to secure a 
two-tier allowance scheme. MSPs (and others) were invited to submit their views on the 
matter of how to reform the allowances system, and these submissions were available on the 
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panel’s Web site (http://allowancesreview.scottish.parliament.uk/). Analysis reveals that 24 of 
the 48 submissions from current MSPs spoke to the issue of electoral status (whether an MSP 
was elected from a constituency or a region) and took a side, at least to some degree. These 
responses were coded as broadly positive or negative to the idea of equality, in constituency 
workload (with consequences for allowances), between constituency and regional MSPs.  
 The majority of submissions (63%) came from constituency MSPs (although they 
constitute the majority – 73 out of 129 – of MSPs, or 57%, so this is to be expected). 
However, the sample, at only 24 out of 129 MSPs, is small and does not include any 
Conservatives or Greens, so is not highly representative of the parliament as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Labour MSPs opposed the idea of equality 
between constituency and regional MSP constituency workload, with all of these MSPs 
elected in constituencies (while two of their regionally elected counterparts supported 
equality). One SNP MSP and one Liberal Democrat MSP, both elected in constituencies, 
joined most Labour MSPs in opposing equality. By contrast, all of the regional MSPs 
supported equality, and one constituency-elected SNP MSP agreed with them. Therefore, 
opinion on the issue of equality appears to follow both party and electoral status (constituency 
or regional) lines. 
 While some comments are quite mild and difficult to code because they barely appear 
to take a ‘side’, most are unambiguous about the MSP’s opinion on the issue. Constituency-
elected Labour MSPs’ comments tend to be rather dismissive of regional MSPs, almost 
always claiming that constituency MSPs have larger caseloads than their regional 
counterparts. Regional MSPs (most of whose submissions come from SNP members) 
complain about the need for equal treatment in terms of allowances and the ability to establish 
offices. Both groups quote from the MSPs’ code of conduct frequently and claim to be 
working in the interests of their constituents. 
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Revisiting the code of conduct 
Jamie Hepburn, SNP regional MSP, invoked the code of conduct when he argued that the 
reduction in the office running costs allowance for regional MSPs in cases where more than 
one is elected per party per region violates the equality of MSPs stated in the code, making it 
difficult for the MSPs to serve constituents: ‘all MSPs – regardless of whether they represent 
a constituency or a region – should be allocated equal allowances. And in a similar vein, all 
MSPs should be able to operate their constituency offices on an equal basis. That is, each 
individual MSP should be able to run an individual constituency office, and that they should 
certainly be allowed to inform their constituents of its existence’ (Hepburn, 2007). Another 
Central Scotland SNP regional MSP, Alex Neil, made similar comments regarding the need 
for equality. He also challenged the notion that constituency MSPs have a greater 
constituency caseload, saying ‘Recently one constituency MSP told me she was dealing with 
about 90 live cases. I am currently dealing [with] more than 150 live cases’ (Neil, 2007). In 
his opinion, the level of constituency caseload has less to do with how the MSP is elected and 
more to do with ‘which party is in government, the profile of individual MSPs and the work 
rate and perceived effectiveness of individual MSPs. Therefore to make a distinction in the 
allowances system between regional MSPs and first past the post members is an absurdity’ 
(Neil, 2007). 
In the above examples, regional MSPs are reacting to what appears to be a common 
view among constituency MSPs that the former have fewer constituency cases to deal with. 
Labour constituency MSP Des McNulty’s submission compared the constituency workload of 
constituency and regional MSPs in this way, referring to the code of conduct’s ‘requirement’ 
that regional MSPs notify constituency MSPs when taking up a case: ‘The workload of 
constituency MSPs differs from that of Regional List Members – there have been very few 
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instances of Regional List members notifying me that they have had cases brought to them by 
my constituents as required by parliamentary rules, and there is little indication that any 
Regional List Member has ever undertaken any significant amount of casework in my area’ 
(McNulty, 2007). The citation of a requirement for regional MSPs to notify constituency 
MSPs upon taking up a case frequently made by Labour MSPs is a reference to the MSPs’ 
code of conduct, which (until it was amended in 2008) stated ‘In the event that a regional 
(‘list’) MSP does raise a constituency case (for example with a Minister or local authority) he 
or she must notify the relevant constituency MSP at the outset unless the consent of the 
constituent is withheld’ (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, Annexe E, Section 8.3.1).  
What began as ‘Guidance from the Presiding Officer’ near the time of the Scottish 
Parliament’s foundation (Scottish Parliament, 2000) had been incorporated into the MSPs’ 
code of conduct, in its eighth section by the time the third edition was drafted in 2007 
(Scottish Parliament, 2008b, Annexe E). Later in 2007, the Standards, Procedures and Public 
Appointments Committee began a consultation on revising the code’s Section 8, 
‘Relationships Between MSPs’, which dealt with how to handle constituency cases, and one 
of the issues upon which it sought written responses was ‘the level of communication 
between regional and constituency members when approached to take on a constituency case’ 
(Scottish Parliament, 2008b, para. 8). Two parts of the code important to the matter of 
equality between constituency and regional MSPs that came under consideration were the 
requirement for regional MSPs to notify constituency MSPs when they took up a constituent’s 
case – frequently cited by constituency MSPs when they commented on regional MSPs’ 
workload, as described above – as well as the assumption that constituents would normally 
approach constituency MSPs before regional MSPs with their cases. Both parts were in 
Section 8.3.1 of the code: 
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The basic principle is that the wishes of the constituent are paramount. In particular, a 
constituent has the right to approach his or her constituency MSP, or any of the seven 
regional MSPs elected in his or her region. They also have the right to expect an MSP 
to take on a case though the MSP must be able to judge how best to do so. It is 
expected, however, that, in practice, the usual point of contact for a constituent raising 
a specific personal or local matter will be his or her constituency MSP. In the event 
that a regional (‘list’) MSP does raise a constituency case (for example with a Minister 
or local authority) he or she must notify the relevant constituency MSP at the outset 
unless the consent of the constituent is withheld. A suggested pro-forma for this 
purpose is attached at Appendix A (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, Annexe E). 
 
 The evidence submitted to the committee included comments from 14 Labour 
constituency MSPs opposed to the removal of the notification requirement and/or the 
statement expecting constituents to approach constituency MSPs (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, 
Annexes F and H). On the point about assuming constituents would approach constituency 
MSPs first, the committee members agreed that the ‘statement could be misinterpreted by the 
public as steering the public to their constituency MSP in the first instance’ and voted 
overwhelmingly (with only Labour constituency MSP Cathie Craigie voting against) in 
favour of removing the statement (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, paras 34-6).  
 The point about notification was more controversial. Some MSPs said that notification 
was not happening (and not, therefore, an indication that regional MSPs were failing to 
perform constituency service, as argued by Labour constituency MSPs), giving various 
reasons for this: ‘in some cases a reflection of the consensual working arrangements between 
regional and constituency MSPs, and in other cases was a reflection of the specific expertise 
or political views of some MSPs. In some cases it was an omission arising from the speed at 
which a case was satisfactorily concluded’ (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, para. 42). Other 
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reasons included confidentiality, even where this was not requested by the constituent. 
Conservative constituency MSP David McLetchie told the committee: ‘Confidentiality is an 
issue. I certainly would not notify a regional member about a case. My starting point is that an 
inquiry that is made at one of my surgeries is confidential and I should not share it with 
anyone unless the constituent asked me to do so. In a sense, the notification rule breaches 
confidentiality, which is not appropriate’ (Scottish Parliament, 2008c, col. 177). In the end, 
the committee voted to remove the notification requirement (Scottish Parliament, 2008b, para. 
44).  
 
Explaining the tensions between constituency and regional MSPs 
These Scottish Parliamentary debates on office staff salary allowances and the code of 
conduct echo the debate in 1999 on the matter of smaller office running cost allowances for 
regional MSPs where more than one is elected from a party in a region, as described earlier. 
Nearly a decade later, attitudes of MSPs do not appear to have moved on much, with several 
Labour MSPs (mainly, but not entirely, elected in constituencies) apparently opposed to 
equality for constituency and regional MSPs, while others (mainly, but not entirely, elected in 
regions) argued against Labour’s case. Many Labour MSPs argued that constituency MSPs 
have larger constituency caseloads, so they deserve larger office allowances. Labour MSPs 
also argued for keeping the code of conduct worded so that regional MSPs were required to 
notify (with a constituent’s consent) constituency MSPs when they took up cases.  
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess independently how much time 
constituency and regional MSPs spend on constituency service (they do not punch time 
clocks!), the only book-length study on the subject found that constituency MSPs did spend a 
larger portion of their work time on constituency service than did their regional counterparts 
(Lundberg, 2007, pp. 178-9), although this type of research is based upon postal surveys of 
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the MSPs themselves reporting an estimate of how they spend their time and has been 
criticised for being potentially unrepresentative (Carman and Shephard, 2007, p. 484). A 
study of what MSPs do in parliament shows that regional MSPs spend more time than their 
constituency counterparts on committees, particularly if they did not engage in dual candidacy 
(Battle, 2011, p. 510). Battle’s research suggests that those regional MSPs expecting to stand 
as both constituency and regional list candidates responded to the electoral incentive to make 
themselves noticed in the constituencies they believed they would be nominated in. This 
incentive, inherent in MMP and potentially good for voters, can cause tensions in the 
relationship between constituency and list MSPs due to the resulting competition.  
While the designers of the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system perhaps should have 
been aware of the potential dangers of MMP, Germany’s record did not indicate tensions 
between constituency and party list deputies within the system – though the animosity 
between Labour and the SNP could be considered more severe than what exists between 
competing parties in Germany. Other PR systems, such as the single transferable vote (STV, 
popular with the SNP and Liberal Democrats, as well as the Electoral Reform Society in 
Britain), have their own drawbacks – STV, which allows voters to rank candidates in order of 
preference, contains an electoral incentive that could promote too much constituency service 
(and even ‘pork barrel’ politics) at the expense of policy expertise and parliamentary work, 
and STV could reduce party cohesion. Indeed, any electoral system that allows intraparty 
preference voting can undermine party unity (Katz 1986: 101), though several European 
countries do allow voters to indicate some degree of candidate preference, which may or may 
not be effective in altering the pre-existing party list rankings. Keeping MMP but banning 
dual candidacy, the case in Welsh Assembly elections since 2007, might reduce the tensions 
between constituency and regional MSPs, but at a price: constituency seats could become 
safer because competitor parties are likely to put their strongest candidates on regional lists, 
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leaving sacrificial lambs to challenge constituency incumbents. Where strong candidates 
nominated in constituency races just miss winning, they are out altogether, hurting 
competitors which, in Wales, are usually the non-Labour parties; there is also the problem of 
failing to elect strong list candidates (such as a party leader) when constituency candidates 
unexpectedly win, leaving no list candidates eligible for election because the party’s 
entitlement has already been elected entirely in constituencies (McAllister and Cole, 2012: 
16). 
 There is no easy remedy to the tensions displayed between constituency and regional 
MSPs, though perhaps the large reduction in constituency Labour MSPs at the 2011 election 
will change that party’s perspective, reducing the hostility to regional MSPs that looked like a 
result of short-term self-interest. Labour MSPs appeared to have assumed that the 2007 
election result was an aberration. Rather than seeing the result as a warning of potential 
trouble in 2011, Labour MSPs displayed short-term rational thinking, and this (perhaps with 
other influences) affected their attitude towards regional MSPs. This contrasts with the long-
term rationality displayed by Labour in the 1990s, when the Scottish Parliament’s electoral 
system was chosen, and a majoritarian system (which would have suited Labour in the short 
term) was rejected in favour of PR, seen as more rational in the long-term (Mitchell, 2000). 
Yet even here, miscalculations can be made, as the SNP’s majority in 2011 shows. PR does 
not guarantee that no single party will win a majority of seats, and some forms of PR, 
particularly those using electoral regions with no national ‘corrective’ tier to compensate 
smaller parties, can make single-party majorities more likely: Spain has seen four majority 
governments since its transition to democracy in the late 1970s, and its lower house of 
parliament uses regional PR (Ministry of the Interior, 2012). Furthermore, Labour’s support 
for a PR-elected Scottish Parliament in the 1990s was probably informed by the likelihood 
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that Labour would have been able to govern in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, a party 
Labour had been co-operating with throughout the 1990s on Scottish constitutional matters. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, MMP has failed to facilitate the kind of new politics advocated by proponents of 
devolution. MMP creates competition over constituency service, thanks to the presence of 
both constituency and regional MSPs, and Labour MSPs, predominately elected in 
constituencies until 2011, appeared to want to reduce this competition, which came mainly 
from the SNP. While dual candidacy has not been banned for Scottish Parliament elections 
(as it was for the Welsh Assembly), the code of conduct’s notification requirement and the 
smaller office staff allowance proposal attempted to reduce competition over constituency 
service. Because most Labour candidates did not engage in dual candidacy, constituency 
elections really were zero-sum games, so this situation partially explains the intensity of 
feeling among Labour MSPs regarding competition from their regional counterparts and 
Labour’s support for the notification requirement and smaller office allowances.  
The hostility sometimes displayed by constituency MSPs towards their regional 
counterparts is not the only failure of the attempt to engineer a new politics into post-
devolution Scotland. Scottish Labour’s 2011 defeat was notable not only for the SNP’s 
achievement of the first majority government since devolution. Labour lost a number of its 
most experienced MSPs, those who would have played a key role in holding the majority 
SNP government to account, thus exacerbating the majoritarian nature of politics after the 
election. Labour’s 2007 result, showing a gradual reduction in its support and some SNP 
constituency victories at Labour’s expense, should have prompted a rethinking of the party’s 
position on dual candidacy. Rather than considering the prospect of a bad election result next 
time, Labour apparently assumed that its constituency candidates would prevail, with its 
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MSPs opposing efforts to reduce the institutional inequality between constituency and 
regional MSPs. Labour’s short-term rationality in terms of regional MSPs illustrates 
institutional effects at the ‘micro’ level, on individual politicians, while the continued hostility 
of Labour MSPs more generally towards regional MSPs shows how institutional engineering 
can fail at the ‘macro’ level. This Scottish example might have implications for the broader 
debate over whether institutional engineering can bring about significant – and positive – 
changes in divided societies. The old expression ‘you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t 
make it drink’ appears to fit the Scottish experience thus far. 
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Table 1 Scottish Parliament elections: 1999, 2007 and 2011 
1999 
Party % Regional 
vote 
Regional 
seats 
% Constituency 
vote 
Constituency 
seats 
Total seats % Seats 
Labour         33.6        3          38.8          53        56    43.4 
Scottish National          27.3      28          28.7            7        35    27.1 
Conservative         15.4      18          15.6            0        18    14.0 
Liberal Democrat         12.4        5          14.2          12        17    13.2 
Greens           3.6        1 -            0          1      0.8 
Scottish Socialist            2.0        1 1.0            0          1      0.8 
Other and independent           5.7        0 1.7            1          1      0.8 
Total       56           73      129  
 
2007 
Party % Regional 
vote 
Regional 
seats 
% Constituency 
vote 
Constituency 
seats 
Total seats % Seats 
Scottish National         31.0      26          32.9          21        47    36.4 
Labour        29.2        9          32.2          37        46    35.7 
Conservative        13.9      13          16.6            4        17    13.2 
Liberal Democrat        11.3        5          16.2          11        16    12.4 
Greens          4.0        2            0.2            0          2      1.6 
Other and independent        10.6        1            1.9            0          1      0.8 
Total       56           73      129  
 
2011 
Party % Regional 
vote 
Regional 
seats 
% Constituency 
vote 
Constituency 
seats 
Total seats % Seats 
Scottish National         44.0      16          45.4          53        69    53.5 
Labour        26.3      22          31.7          15        37    28.7 
Conservative        12.4      12          13.9            3        15    11.6 
Liberal Democrat          5.2        3            7.9            2          5      3.9 
Greens          4.4        2 -  0          2      1.6 
Other and independent          7.7        1            1.1            0          1      0.8 
Total       56           73      129  
Source: BBC News Web site (1999; 2007; 2011) 
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